Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee: Narrowing Voting Right Protections

Facts of the Case: Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee

Arizona follows two voting methods: in-person voting, in which every registered voter is assigned to a precinct based on their address, and mail-in ballots. If a registered voter votes in an unassigned precinct, or if a mail-in ballot is collected by an unpermitted person–that is, anyone other than the voters’ family, caregiver or postal worker–the vote is not counted, and the ballot is thrown away under §§16-411 and §§16–1005(H)–(I). 

However innocent these policies may seem, the consequences have largely affected marginalized communities, such as the states’ American Indian, Hispanic, and African American citizens. As a result, the federal court holding jurisdiction over Arizona, known as the Ninth Circuit, challenged these policies as racially discriminatory; alleging that such restrictions were enacted with discriminatory intent, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment. 

Considering all this, the Supreme Court ruled against the Ninth Circuit and upheld Arizona’s voting policies. The Court’s decision to dismiss these policies as non-discriminatory, despite widely impacting marginalized communities, significantly narrows Section 2 of the VRA. In other words, this ruling undermines protections against racial discrimination in voting. Which sets a precedent for similar cases affecting marginalized voters, raising concerns about systemic inequality, ultimately making it harder to block discriminatory policies in the future. 

Legal Background

The Ninth Circuit challenged these policies as racially discriminatory under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the 15th Amendment. Section 2 prohibits voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the basis of race, color, or membership in one a language minority group–defined as persons who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage. Furthermore, the 15th Amendment ensures the right of citizens to vote without being denied or abridged on the account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 

Even if these voting restrictions were not enacted with a discriminatory purpose, it has nonetheless resulted in Latino, Native American, and Black voters in Arizona having their ballots rejected more than their white counterparts. Poll locations were frequently moved around in communities of color and located in counterintuitive places, namely near the edges of precincts. Furthermore, Native Americans heavily rely on mail-in voting due to tribal locations being in remote areas without access to residential mail delivery, and registered voters rely on someone else besides themselves to return their ballot due to limited access to transportation. However, this results in ballots being dismissed as it violated §§16–1005(H)–(I), in which it is illegal for an unpermitted person to deliver a mail-in ballot. 

The Supreme Court Opinion

The Majority opinion of the court found these allegations to be unfounded. Arguing that Arizona’s voting restrictions were not enacted with discriminatory intent and would in no way perpetrate meaningful inequality in minority voters’ electoral opportunities, or impede minority voters from electing representatives of their choice. The court argued these policies do not deny the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, but instead serve as minor inconveniences, which are insufficient grounds to qualify as discrimination. 

Dissenting from the Majority opinion, Justice Kagan, Breyer, and Sotomayor emphasized a duty to carry out democracy and uphold racial equality, and ruling for these discriminatory policies to persist would run contrary to that purpose. Further arguing that this decision would set “broad implications for the fairness of our democracy,” as it seemingly undermines the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Delivering the dissent, Justice Kagan cites Section 2 of the VRA, holding it to be the single statute that, “reminds us of the worst of America…as the promise of political equality remained a distant dream for African American citizens. Because States and localities continually contrived new rules…to keep minority voters from the polls.” Historically, southern states passed various laws impeding on Black Americans ability to vote, and the VRA was designed to protect against this. Therefore, in similar situations where minority groups are not being politically represented, a similar sentiment should persist. 

The VRA holds that it is considered discriminatory if a minority group bears the effects of discrimination in areas that hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process. In other words, it should not necessarily matter whether a policy was enacted with a discriminatory intent; what matters is whether groups in our democracy have an equal chance of representation, in an area in which Arizona falls short. 

Legal Implications 

The Court’s decision to protect policies that have resulted in minority groups receiving less representation weakens Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This decision sets a dangerous precedent in which future cases of discrimination will be harder to stop, that is because Section 2, a policy protecting against discriminatory policies, has already been undermined. To illustrate, imagine scenarios in which minority voices have been indirectly affected and consequently suppressed. This ruling is not concerned with its consequences, so long as a policy was not designed with a discriminatory intent, it should be upheld. Dismissed voices in any aspect of society is especially dangerous to our democracy, and therefore raises concerns about equal representation. 

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